Bodyguards and Secret Service personnel responsible for protecting heads of state like to share their fitness activities through Strava, thereby revealing their whereabouts. French newspaper Le Monde has discovered this and reports that the underlying problem was identified six years ago but has still not been fully resolved. US President Joe Biden, his deputy Kamala Harris, former President Donald Trump, French President Emmanuel Macron and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin were confirmed as potential security risks. Jill Biden and Melania Trump are also affected.
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Watch the activities of heads of state
According to Le Monde, 26 employees of the US Secret Service, 12 of the French Groupe de Sécurité de la Présidency de la Republic, and six employees of the Russian Presidential Security Service FSO were identified as publicly sharing their fitness activities on Strava. This makes it possible to see where they and their heads of state are. In Macron’s case, the route was a weekend trip that was not made public. Furthermore, bodyguards would inadvertently reveal their place of residence and personal habits, potentially making them vulnerable to blackmail attempts.
When faced with potentially dangerous data made available in this way, those responsible in the United States as well as in France ignored it. The authorities are informed about the whereabouts of Macron & Co. and adequate security is always ensured. Macron’s office was quoted as saying the risk was “negligible”. The Secret Service also believes that the hideouts are routinely made public and have no impact on security. Nevertheless, employees should be informed about the potential source of danger. However, Le Monde sees a risk, for example if the bodyguard travels to already secret locations and then reveals them via Strava.
The revelations that Le Monde is now publishing under the headline Stravleaks are reminiscent of similar revelations in previous years. These began in 2018 when it was discovered that sporty soldiers were actually revealing confidential data about themselves, their teammates, and their forces through activity trackers. For example, Strava’s “Global Heatmap” to visualize over a billion activities also included data from Western troops in Afghanistan. This made it possible to identify previously unknown outposts. Four years later, Strava was still revealing sensitive information about military personnel and secret services.
(mho)
