Largely unnoticed by the public, the largest German secret service in the Federal Republic is the Military Intelligence Service (MilNW) and its approximately 7,000 employees established in the Bundeswehr. Unlike the three well-known institutions, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) and the Military Counter-Intelligence Service (MAD), it is allowed to monitor almost unchecked and is hardly controlled.
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Corbinian Ruckerbauer and Thorsten Wetzling of the think tank Interface (formerly the New Responsibility Foundation) made this clear at the Netzpolitik.org “Bildete Netz” conference in Berlin on Friday. Both say that this construction is extremely questionable from a constitutional point of view. The traffic light coalition knows this, but still does nothing about it.
Foreigners are the target
MilNW does not focus on the soldiers themselves, but mainly on people from other countries, like two researchers in one Technical Articles To do this, the service listens to radio and cell phone conversations, recruits informants abroad and systematically and automatically evaluates information from the Internet.
All of this serves MilNW’s core function of covering the military information needs of political and military decision makers, including the federal government.
The BND also provides data to MilNW
A key area of ​​focus for MilNW is telecommunications intelligence, also known as signals intelligence (SIGINT). This is done both with stationary antennas and mobile sensors on land, air and water vehicles, Ruckerbauer said.
In addition, a very large amount of data from the BND’s own SIGINT is automatically transmitted to the Bundeswehr. It is extremely difficult to ensure that “only military personnel are affected”.

There is no law for restraining force
Both the Military Intelligence Service and the BND intercept communications on a large scale. From a purely technical point of view, it is not possible to exclude significant amounts of “bycatch”, for example from uninvolved and suspicious citizens. In addition, publicly available information and, from 2023, data from the armed forces’ SARA satellite system are being used.
Wetzling sees many problems with this form of surveillance. For example, there is a massive interference with citizens’ basic rights. These include telecommunications privacy, freedom of the press and informational self-determination. This requires clear and specific legality as well as protective provisions so that the whole thing does not become inconsistent.
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The Federal Constitutional Court made this clear with the BND verdict in 2020. The Karlsruhe judges knew that the data would be collected and that, combined with other methods, a “very detailed personal profile” could be created. You are talking about “additional encroachments on fundamental rights”.
But so far there is no specific law that regulates the surveillance activities of the Bundeswehr’s interception force, the two complained. If so, the requirements are only laid down in internal service regulations, which is completely inadequate. “There are explosives there,” Wetzling stressed.
Researchers warn: BND may circumvent its own rules
On the other hand, the BND has had many requirements for surveillance measures for many years. It must first define a legitimate purpose, provide evidence of a specific threat and comply with limitations. The ordering process must be done in writing to check acceptability.
Ruckerbauer sees a particular fundamental rights threat in the MilNW’s approach if the overlap of its activities, particularly with the BND and MAD, results in “close cooperation as well as strong discrepancies in the intensity of rules”. This could lead to rules being circumvented.
It seems obvious that foreign intelligence services in particular would outsource tasks to MilNW, since military intelligence can act more independently.
While particularly intrusive measures by the BND are subject to independent legal review, the Bundeswehr’s approval is given within the authorization, the researchers point out. Karlsruhe has highlighted in several decisions how important independent prior control is for such interventions. Because while those affected could later defend themselves in court, this is hardly possible with secret surveillance.
Another major gap exists in parliamentary control. This is limited by the broad mandate of the Defence Committee and its limited resources. Many MPs also know little about MilNW. None of these meet the minimum constitutional requirements.
Kelber complains about multiple data security breaches
Federal Data Protection Commissioner Ulrich Kelber, who recently left office, provided his insight Current 32nd Activity Report First about an inspection by MilNW at the Heinrich Hertz barracks in Don/Eifel. In this they have complained about numerous data protection violations.
The relevance of the information collected is often unclear, data sets are poorly maintained, and deletion is rare. Furthermore, the protection of information about minors is not guaranteed.
The Traffic Light Alliance does not operate with “seeing eyes”.
Kelber also criticized the lack of a legal basis. However, the inspector could not impose requirements or sanctions or delete illegal files – he did not have the authority to do so.
Ruckerbauer and Wetzling criticize that the traffic light is doing nothing “in clear sight” in the MilNW case despite promises of comprehensive intelligence reform. In the Kunduz report in 2011, the SPD parliamentary group highlighted significant coordination and control problems around the military intelligence service, which the government and legislators had to solve.
Defence Minister believes there is “no specific need for regulation”
Before joining the government, the Greens criticized the fact that the MilNW was massively interfering with fundamental rights without a legal basis. This situation is not compatible with the Basic Law and harms the population’s trust in the Bundeswehr.
On the other hand, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius recently pointed out: The Military Intelligence Service or MilNW has a special status: “That’s why I don’t see any particular need for regulation.”
(No)
