Huawei ban: Digital ministry rejects lobbying allegations

The organizations FragDenStaat and LobbyControl complain about inconsistencies in the agreement between the federal government and network operators on the use of Chinese technology in mobile networks. They criticize: Heavy lobbying pressure from Huawei, Telekom and other network operators on the federal government delayed the exclusion for years despite security concerns.

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In response to freedom of information requests, the Federal Ministry of Digital and Transport (BMDV) released the almost completely blacked out document with only a reference to security interests. It can be found there One sentence about “state of affairs” For a meeting between digital state secretary Stefan Schnorr (FDP) and Huawei’s chief representative in Germany Michael Yang at the end of March 2022: “A general exclusion of a manufacturer of network components from the installation of 5G infrastructure is not planned.” This is also stated in the note of a meeting between digital minister Volker Wissing (FDP) and Telekom board member Tim Hottjes.

Was it misinterpreted?

Lobby Control Criticizedhow often representatives of network operators and Huawei met with representatives of the federal government. Hottges spoke particularly often on the topic of Huawei and 5G. He received open ears from former Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU), Wissing and Economics Minister Robert Habeck (Greens). More serious, according to the organizations, is that the BMDV went out the window even before the legal review of any exclusion, which is enshrined in the law of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI).

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A BMDV spokesperson rejected online the accusation that Fragdenstatt had misinterpreted the word “provided”. The controversial statement is solely about the “description of the legal situation” in the BSI law. Accordingly, the use of a critical component can be restricted if it is likely to affect public order or security in the Federal Republic. A concrete security policy assessment must be made without a provision for a general boycott of the manufacturer of network components. This wording “does not mean any intention or plan of the federal government, but rather describes the scope of the legal norm”.

In IT Security Act 2.0 Or there is a “Huawei clause” in the amended BSI law. However, this makes the barrier to excluding individual suppliers from network expansion for 5G, for example, comparatively high. The federal government should thus be able to prohibit the use of “critical components” in the event of an “expected impairment of public safety and order”.

BMDV also does not want to accept the claim that the ministry “blocked the decision on security issues in mobile network expansion or strongly advocated for Huawei”. In principle, the government does not take a different stance on such security issues. This also becomes clear from the measures adopted by BMI and the agreements it has made with network operators.

Huawei declined to comment on the allegations. Supplier circles said that according to the BSI law, non-critical components such as 5G antennas cannot be excluded in any way. Moreover, testing components already installed is not mandatory, but possible. The former black-red coalition also repeatedly stressed that the IT security law should not become a Huawei law.

Deal with concessions

Antonia Hamidi, analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERSIS), Evaluated the agreement found on ZDF More than half-baked. In order for operators to agree to the deal with BMI, the Ministry of the Interior had to make “very clear concessions”. The agreement was clearly made in favour of “lower costs and less burden on companies”.

Adrian Dabrowski, a researcher at the CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, said the opportunities for access and abuse remain open: “As long as I have some network element – even if it’s not critical – it still opens up the possibility of a backdoor.” It could also be used to attack components that “may be from another manufacturer”.

(vbr)